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NOTE
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY RULE PROMULGATIONCLEAN AIR ACT STATE IMPLEMENTATION PLAN
REQUIREMENT-New Mexico EID v. Thomas, 789
F.2D 825 (10th Cir. 1986)
The Environmental Protection Agency [EPA] promulgated a rule imposing sanctions on the state of New Mexico for failure to submit an
approved State Implementation Plan [SIP] as required by the Clean Air
Act [CAA]. The New Mexico Environmental Improvement Division [EID]
petitioned the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals for review of the EPA's
final rule. The Court of Appeals upheld the EPA imposition of sanctions
cutting off a portion of the CAA funds received by New Mexico.
Three issues will be taken up by this note: whether the EPA action was
rulemaking or adjudication; the appropriate standard of review for the
EPA action; the court's employment of a legal fiction in upholding the
EPA's conclusion that New Mexico had not submitted an SIP.'
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Clean Air Act [CAA], 2 requires that states submit an SIP for
achieving air pollution levels in accordance with the National Ambient
Air Quality Standards [NAAQS]. Under the CAA, states may divide their
territory into air quality control regions [AQCRs]. New Mexico created
eight AQCRs, one comprising Bemalillo County and parts of two adjoining counties, designated AQCR 2.' For the purposes of the CAA,
AQCR 2 was considered a nonattainment area for the pollutant carbon
monoxide [CO].' In areas where CO levels are not attained, the CAA
requires vehicle emission control inspection and maintenance programs
to be submitted, approved and implemented as part of the SIP New
I. The legal fiction is that although New Mexico had in fact submitted an SIP that had been
approved by the EPA, the EPA determined that New Mexico failed to submit an SIP and imposed
sanctions based on that determination.
2. 42 U.S.C. §§7401-7642 (1977).
3. New Mexico Environmental Imp. Div. v. Thomas, 789 F.2d 825, 828 (10th Cir. 1986).
4. 42 U.S.C. §7502 provides that if a state demonstrates to the satisfaction of the administrator
of the EPA that attainment of carbon monoxide [CO1 levels in accordance with the NAAQS is not
possible in an area prior to Dec. 31, 1982, despite the implementation of all reasonably available
measures, provisions of the SIP shall provide for attainment of the required CO levels as expeditiously
as practicable but not later than Dec. 31, 1987. Such an area is considered a nonattainment area.
5. Section 7502(b)(I 1)(B) requires that where an SIP includes a nonattainment evaluation for the
pollutant CO, it must include a provision establishing a specific schedule for implementation of a
vehicle emission control inspection and maintenance program.
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Mexico submitted an SIP which included an inspection maintenance
[I/M] program. The SIP was approved by the EPA.
New Mexico law in effect at the time the SIP was approved permitted
the city and county to assume authority for air quality programs within
AQCR 2.6 The IM program was operated by the city of Albuquerque
and Bernalillo County.7 The program was in operation for seventeen
months when the New Mexico Supreme Court in Chapman v. Luna held
that it was in violation of state law.' After the ruling in Chapman, AQCD
2 discontinued operation of the I/M program without attempting modifications. Instead, the Air Quality Control Board passed a resolution
asking the state legislature to fund a new program.
Once the /M program was held in violation of state law, the EPA
notified New Mexico's governor that New Mexico's SIP would be disapproved and sanctions could be imposed, discontinuing federal funds
for projects which would contribute to the enhancement of pollution
problems. 9 In September of 1984 the EPA issued a notice of proposed
rulemaking, stating grounds for disapproval of New Mexico's SIP. The
notice indicated possible sanctions, and the means for their imposition.
Several public meetings were held between state and local officials. Private meetings between the EPA, federal, state and local personnel were
also held.'"
On March 4, 1985, the EPA issued a final rule." The rule disapproved
New Mexico's previously approved SIP, imposed sanctions, reviewed
comments received, and gave the reasons for its decision. The sanctions
imposed cut-off funds received directly by AQCD 2, and a portion of the
total CAA monies received by New Mexico in proportion to the percentage
of the state's total population living in AQCD 2. "
6. New Mexico Air Quality Control Act, N.M.S.A. §§74-2-1 to -17 (Repl. Pamp. 1986).
7. The Albuquerque City Council and the Bemalillo County Commission enacted ordinances
prohibiting excessive pollutant emissions from motor vehicles in Albuquerque and Bernalillo County.
These ordinances delegated the power to operate vehicle I/M programs to the Albuquerque-Bernalillo
County Air Quality Control Board. Chapman v. Luna, 101 N.M. 59, 678 P.2d 687 (1984).
8. Chapman v. Luna, 101 N.M. 59, 678 P.2d 687 (1984). Petitioners filed a suit in New Mexico
District Court seeking a declaratory judgment that the I/M program was unlawful. The District Court
dismissed the complaint and the petitioners appealed. The Supreme Court of New Mexico held that:
I) the I/M program violated state law which prohibited counties from charging any fees for motor
vehicles regardless of the purpose of the fees, N.M.S.A. 1978 §66-6-25 (Cum. Supp. 1983); 2)
the imposition of inspection fees was not a valid exercise of local authorities' home rule power; 3)
the exclusion of pre- 1968 cars from the repair cost provision was not a violation of equal protection;
4) the inapplicability of the repair cost cap to vehicles that are in need of repair or replacement of
anti-pollution control devices was not discriminatory; 5) the repair cap provision was invalid; 6) the
criminal penalty provisions of the ordinance were not invalid; 7) the invalid provisions of the act
were severable and the program could be continued without the imposition of a fee and without a
repair cap for vehicles not passing the test.
9. Thomas. 789 F.2d at 828.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 829.
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EID appealed the rulemaking decision of the EPA to the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals. EID contended that: 1) the EPA's action was in excess
of statutory authority since the SIP had been approved and had only
become inadequate after the ruling in Chapman; 2) the sanctions imposed
were arbitrary and capricious; 3) the formula used to calculate the portion
of CAA monies withheld from the state unlawfully penalized and jeopardized the AQCDs that had attained the required CO levels. 3
This note will first probe the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals' determination of the appropriate judicial standard of review of the EPA action,
and its willingness to examine the character of the proceeding in determining that standard. Next, the note will turn to the court's use of a legal
fiction in upholding the EPA's conclusion that New Mexico had not
submitted an SIP. Justifying the legal fiction by upholding the EPA's
interpretation of CAA language, the court in Thomas held that although
New Mexico had submitted an SIP, the EPA correctly ruled that New
Mexico had not submitted an SIP. 4
BACKGROUND
Determinationof the Standard of Review

The first task before the court in Thomas was to determine the appropriate judicial standard of review for the EPA action. The CAA authorizes
review of the EPA action but does not specify the standard of review to
be applied.' 5 Generally, courts have held that review of approval or disapproval of an SIP is limited to determining whether the findings were
arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of discretion. 6 However, the EPA's
action in Thomas, strictly speaking, was not an action disapproving an
SIP, but was a ruling that an SIP had not been submitted, thereafter
imposing sanctions for New Mexico's failure to submit.
The court in Thomas first turned to the Administrative Procedure Act
[APA] "7for guidance. Under the APA, the standard of review is dependent
upon the classification of an action as adjudication or rulemaking. " The
13. Id.

14. The court held that the EPA's interpretation of "considers" as "satisifies" in the text of
§ 7506(a)(3) of the CAA justified the imposition of sanctions where the SIP did not satisfy the
requirement that it contain an adequately funded or legally enforceable I/M program. Id. at 833.
15. 42 U.S.C. §7607(b)(1) provides "[a] petition for review of the administrator's action in
approving or promulgating any implementation plan under § 7410 of this title . . . or any other final
action of the administrator under this chapter (including any denial or disapproval by the administrator
under subchapter I of this chapter) which is locally or regionally applicable may be filed only in the
United States Court of Appeals for the appropriate district."
16. Friends of the Earth v. EPA, 499 F.2d 1118 (2nd Cir. 1974), South Terminal Corp. v. EPA,
504 F.2d 646 (1st Cir. 1974), Texas v. EPA, 499 F.2d 289 (Tex. C.A. 1974), Union Electric Co.
v. EPA, 515 F.2d 206 (8th Cir. 1975).
17. 5 U.S.C. §705 (1982).
18. Section 706 of the APA specifies different standards of review dependant upon the classification
of an action as rulemaking or adjudication.

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 27

court stated that in order for the EPA action to be adjudication within the
meaning of the APA "the CAA must provide that ' hearings
be held on
19
the record after an opportunity for agency hearing.

The requirement that statutory language must expressly state that a
hearing be held "on the record" in order to trigger procedures required
for adjudication under the APA has been relaxed. In United States v.
Florida East Coast Railway Co.," the court stated that the same result
would obtain where language is tantamount to such a requirement. This
loosened standard has been applied and clarified in subsequent cases.
Citing Florida East Coast Railway Co., the court in Sea Coast AntiPollution League v. Costle,2" held that the precise words "on the record"
were not needed to trigger adjudicatory procedures under the APA.
In Thomas, the court held that the CAA did not require a hearing on
the record for the EPA action imposing sanctions under Section 7506(a),
and that consequently the EPA action was not adjudication under the APA
definition.22 The court, however, did not end its inquiry with APA definitions. In addition it looked to the character of the proceeding to determine whether it was informal rulemaking or adjudication. The court
observed that elements of both rulemaking and adjudication were present
in this case. 3
Historically, much confusion has surrounded the issue of what distinguishes rulemaking and adjudication. In Florida East Coast, the court
stated "while the line dividing them may not always be a bright one
(there is) a recognized distinction in administrative law between proceedings for the purpose of promulgating policy-type rules or standards,
on the one hand, and proceedings designed to adjudicate disputed facts
in particular cases, on the other."24 In dicta, the court explained its holding
that the Interstate Commerce Act did not require an adjudicatory type
hearing for a rulemaking proceeding setting per diem rates for freight
cars. The court stated that no single railroad carrier was singled out and
that factual inferences were used in the formulation of a legislative type
judgment for prospective application only.
Other courts have explained how the character of a proceeding points
toward adjudication or rulemaking. In Hercules Inc. v. EPA,5 the court
stated that rules are categorical, not individual or local determinations,
have solely future effect, do not apply to anything prior to promulgation,
19. Thomas, 789 E2d at 829.
20. 410 U.S. 224 (1973).
21. 572 F2d 872 (1st Cir.1978).
22. Thomas, 789 F2d at 829.
23. "The proceedings here ... effected a single entity, implicated both legislative and judicial
functions of the agency, and resulted in the withholding of federal grant money." Id.
24. FloridaEast Coast, 410 U.S. at 245.
25. 598 F.2d 91 (D.C. Cir.1978).
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and are policy oriented rather than concerned with issues of fact in any
particular activity. 6
The court in American Express Co. v. United States,27 described clearly
and comprehensively the criteria various courts have used for distinguishing between rulemaking and adjudication, and is thus instructive on the
subject. The dispute in American Express Co., focused on whether the
Secretary of Treasury's actions in levying a duty based on the determination of the existence of a bounty was rulemaking or adjudication. The
court stated:
rulemaking is legislative in nature, is primarily concerned with policy
considerations for the future rather than the evaluation of past conduct
and looks ... to policymaking conclusions to be drawn from the
facts. On the other hand, adjudication is judicial rather than legislative in nature, has an accusatory flavor and may result in some
form of disciplinary action and is concerned with issues of fact under
stated law.2"
The court went on to state that generally adjudication resembles what
courts do in deciding cases, and rulemaking resembles what legislatures
do in enacting statutes. The court reasoned that the determination of the
existence of a bounty was a fact finding activity and that the levying of
a duty was required (nondiscretionary), indicating the Secretary was not
carrying out any delegated legislative authority. Thus, the court held the
action of the Secretary was adjudication.29
The utility of classifying an action as rulemaking or adjudication has
been seriously questioned. In City of Chicago, Ill. v. Federal Power
Commission,' citing numerous authorities, the court stated:
[i]n many cases it is unnecessary, and even unwise, to classify a
given proceeding as either adjudicatory or rulemaking. The line between the two is frequently a thin one and the resolution of a given
problem will rarely turn wholly on whether the proceeding is placed
in one category or another. Moreover, obsession with attempts to
place agency action in the proper category may often obscure the
real issue which divides the parties and requires our resolution. 3
The court in City of Chicago held that the inquiry on review depended
not on whether the Federal Power Commission had issued a rule or an
adjudicatory order, but rather on the nature of the record presented to the
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Id. at 117.
472 F.2d 1050 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
Id. at 1055.
Id. at 1055-56.
458 E2d 731 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
Id. at 739.
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court for review.3 2 Similar reasoning is found in K.C. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise stating "sometimes the best solution of the problem ... may be to avoid [classification] . . . and to proceed directly to
the problem at hand . . . to determine appropriate procedure for a particular activity.""
The Fourth Circuit has also questioned the utility of classification. In
AppalachianPower Co. v. EPA, the court Stated that modern precedent
has discarded classification of an action as rulemaking or adjudication as
criteria for determining the type of hearing to which parties are entitled.
This view is not shared by all circuits, however, and Davis states it "seems
to be the opposite of what the Supreme Court had said earlier the same
year in the Florida East Coast opinion." 3" The court in Thomas ultimately
held that because the facts did not form the basis of a dispute and only
legal6conclusions were contested, the EPA action was informal rulemak3
ing.
Application of the Standardof Review
Given a finding that the EPA action was informal rulemaking, the court
in Thomas held "the appropriate standard of review is arbitrary and
capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with
law." 3 7 Had the court held that the EPA action was adjudication, the
appropriate standard
of review would have been "unsupported by sub38
stantial evidence."
The arbitrary and capricious standard as it pertains to agency action
was expounded in the seminal case of Citizens to Preserve Overton Park
v. Volpe. 39 The Overton Park Court identified a three point inquiry for
judicial review of an agency action under the standard. First, the court
must determine whether an agency acted within the scope of its authority,
involved in which is a determination whether the agency can reasonably
32. Petitioner sought review of an order of the Federal Power Commission directing methods for
valuation of natural gas for rate-making purposes.

33. K.C.

DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE,

§ 7.2 (2nd ed. 1979).

34. 477 F.2d 495, 500 (4th Cir. 1973).
35. K.C. DAVIS, supra note 32.
36. 789 F.2d at 829,
37. Id, (citing Delaware Citizens for Clean Air, Inc. v,EPA, 480 F.2d 972, (3rd Cir. 1973)). In
Delaware Citizens, 480 F.2d at 976, the court found that the standard of review for EPA action
approving an SIP was "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance
with law" under § 706(2)(A) of the APA.
38. Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E). The potential significance of the substantial evidence standard of review on the outcome of the case is unclear. The core of the dispute
in Thomas was whether the EPA's interpretation of § 7506(a) was incorrect, resulting in an action
exceeding the scope of the EPA's authority, Since there was no factual dispute, the best EID could
have hoped for was less deference to the EPA's interpretation under the substantial evidence standard
of review. It is not immediately clear this would have occurred, thus EID may have perceived the
apparent futility of arguing that the EPA action was adjudication.
39. 401 U.S. 402 (1971),
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be said to have acted within the range of choices specified by Congress.
This includes an inquiry into the agency's interpretation of its statutory
authority.' Second, the court must determine whether the actual choice
made was based on a consideration of relevant factors and whether there
has been a clear error in judgment."' Third, the court must inquire whether
the agency has followed the necessary procedural requirements. 2
In Thomas, the EPA found that New Mexico had never submitted an
SIP because it did not have legal authority to implement all the elements
required by the CAA, specifically: it lacked legal authority to implement
the I/M program.4 The EPA also found that New Mexico had not made
reasonable efforts to submit an SIP. Based on these findings the EPA
imposed sanctions under Section 7506(a) of the CAA.'
EID's challenge to the EPA's decision that New Mexico had violated
Section 7506(a) did not dispute the evidence on which the EPA relied,
nor did it contest the procedures followed by the EPA. The focus of EID's
challenge was on: 1)the EPA's interpretation of the language of Section
7506(a)(3) which resulted in the sanctions;" 5 and 2) the EPA's failure to
consider evidence that New Mexico was making reasonable efforts toward
implementing an alternative I/M program. The EID contended that through
the EPA's interpretation of the language in Section 7506(a), the EPA
improperly imposed sanctions under that section in excess of its statutory
authority, and that the EPA should have proceeded under Section 7506(b).'
Using the words of the Overton ParkCourt, the key issue in Thomas was
whether the EPA acted within the range of choices specified by Congress.
Secondarily, EID raised the issue whether the EPA should have considered
additional evidence.
The Thomas court relied on an explication of the arbitrary and capricious standard in Motor Vehicle ManufacturersAss'n. v. State Farm Mutual 7
in focusing on EID's contention that the EPA should have considered
additional evidence. 48 In State Farm Mutual, the court stated that an
agency action would be arbitrary and capricious if the agency:
40. Id. at 416.
41. Id.
42. Id.at417.
43. 789 F.2d at 831.
44. Section 7506(a) provides for sanctions where the administrator of the EPA finds that a state
has "not submitted an implementation plan which considers each of the elements required by § 7502"
or "that reasonable efforts toward submitting an implementation plan are not being made."
45. In Thomas, 789 F.2d at 833, the court stated that in imposing sanctions under § 7506(a) the
EPA in effect interpreted "considers" in § 7506(a)(3) as "satisifes." See supra note 44.
46. Id. The two subsections sanction different events: (a) punishes a failure to submit or make
reasonable efforts toward submitting an SIP; while (b) punishes a lack of implementation. EID
conceded implementation problems.
47. 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
48. Thomas, 789 F.2d at 830. This issue calls into play the second part of the Overton Park
inquiry.
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relied on factors which Congress intended it not to consider, entirely
failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, [offered] an
explanation to its decision that [ran] counter to the evidence before
the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a
difference in view or the product of agency expertise.49
Following the arbitrary and capricious standard as explicated in State
Farm, the court in Thomas quickly disposed of EID's claim that the EPA
failed to consider evidence that New Mexico was seeking alternative
funding for the I/M program,'" observing that New Mexico's efforts made
subsequent to the EPA's rule promulgation were not in the agency record.
The court held the agency would not be required to consider after the
fact information and that the EPA's action would be upheld if it was
explained by evidence in the record. 5
Turning to the key issue, the question before the court was what the
task of the reviewing court should be when it examines an agency's
interpretation of a statute. In Overton Park, the court held the agency's
interpretation of the applicable statute was incorrect, stating that the
statutory language was plainly and explicitly to the contrary.52 Overton
Park, however, only made it clear that a court may substitute its interpretation for that of an agency when the intent of Congress is clear from
plain and explicit statutory language. In Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc.,-" the court held that if congressional
intent is clear the court may substitute its judgment for that of the agency,
but that when Congress did not clearly express its intent, the question
becomes whether the agency has been reasonable in its interpretation of
the statute.
The Tenth Circuit has developed case law further clarifying the circumstances under which a court will defer to the interpretation of an
agency charged with the enforcement of a statute.54 Relying on this case
law, the court in Thomas stated the test used for defering to an agency's
interpretation of a statute it is charged with enforcing is whether the
"interpretation is not contrary to the clear statutory intent or plain meaning
of the statute, . . .[is] contemporaneous with the legislation's enactment,
49. Id. at 43.
50. After the ruling in Chapman v. Luna, the city/county Board could have funded .the I/M
program itself, but instead chose to ask the state legislature for funding. "At the time the EPA issued
its final rule, the state legislature had not acted to fund the 1/M program." Thomas at 834. After the
EPA's rule promulgation, the state and the city/county again attempted to seek alternative funding.
Id.

51. Id. at 834 (citing Anderson v. U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 701
F.2d 112 (10th Cir. 1983) as Tenth Circuit precedent supporting its holding on this point).
52. Overton Park at 821.

53. 104 S.Ct. 2778 (1984).
54. See generally, American Mining Congress v.Thomas, 772 F.2d 617 (10th Cir. 1985), Emery
Mining Corp. v.Secretary of Labor, 744 F.2d 1411 (10th Cir. 1984).
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and when such interpretation has been consistently adhered to by the
agency over time." 5
The court in Thomas noted that the imposition of sanctions under both
Section 7506(a) and (b) is not discretionary, but mandatory,56 and that
under the agency's own interpretation of the statute the EPA had no choice
but to proceed under Section 7506(a).57 The court also observed that the
sanctions imposed under Section 7506(a) and (b) are equivalent in all
respects except that the denial of transportation funds is not authorized
under Section 7506(b). The denial of transportation funds, however, was
not contested by EID. Because the EPA had used the same formulas to
calculate the remaining sanctions under the two sections, the court could
not determine how EID would have been in a different position if the
EPA had proceeded under Section 7506(b)." Nevertheless, the court held
the EPA was authorized to proceed under Section 7506(a).59 Applying
the test from American Mining Congress, the court found in Section 7401
and Section 7502(c) of the CAA the clear statutory intent to lessen the
nation's air pollution within a strict time frame.' The court held that
EPA's interpretation of "considers" as "satisfies" in Section 7506(a)
furthered this intent. 6"Next, the court examined whether the EPA's interpretation was consistently adhered to over time.
Section 7506 was added to the CAA in 1977. The EPA announced its
interpretation of Section 7506 in the Federal Register shortly after its
enactment.6 2 The document included the requirement that the SIP "adopt
in legally enforceable form . . . all measures necessary to provide for
attainment by the prescribed date." '63 In the same document the EPA
announced guidelines for the interpretation of Section 7410(a)(2)(F), 4 as
amended in 1977, which requires that "a state will have adequate funding
and authority to carry out an SIP."' 65
55. Thomas, 789 F2d at 831-32 (citing American Mining Congress v. Thomas, 772 F.2d 617
(10th Cir. 1985)).
56. Id. at 830.
57. Id. at 831.58 With respect to contested funds, the court is correct that New Mexico would
have been in no different position under § 7506(b). However, if the EPA proceeded improperly under
§ 7506(a), the agency's action would have been invalid by virtue of exceeding its statutory authority
and the rule imposing sanctions would have been nullified.
59. Id. at 833.
60. Id. Section 7401 of the CAA is titled "Congressional findings and declaration of purpose."
Section 7401(3) states that "the prevention and control of air pollution at its source is the primary
responsibility of states and local governments." Section 7502 states that SIPs "shall contain enforceable measures to assure attainment of the applicable standard not later than Dec. 31, 1987."
61. Thomas, 789 F.2d at 833.
62. 43 Fed. Reg. 21,673-75 (May 19, 1978).
63. Id.
64. Section 7410(a)(2)(F) applies to all elements of an SIP including additional elements required
under § 7502 for non attainment areas.
65. In specific reference to I/M programs, the document stated that "where the necessary legal
authority does not currently exist, it must be obtained ... inno case ... later than July I, 1980."
43 Fed. Reg. 21, 675-76 (May 19, 1978).
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Given the history of the development and adherence of the EPA to its
interpretation of Section 7506(a), the court found the EPA's interpretation
was announced shortly after the 1977 amendments were enacted and had
been consistently adhered to for eight years. Thus, the court held that
the EPA interpretation met the requirements of the test for deference.'
ANALYSIS
-Determinationof the Standard of Review
Contrary to the holding in Thomas, the EPA action looks much like
what courts have described as adjudication. The EPA action involved a
finding that New Mexico had not submitted an SIP, and it resulted in
sanctions with a clear disciplinary flavor. In contrast to the characterization of rulemaking in extant case law, the EPA action was not a legislative type action primarily concerned with policy considerations for
the future and having categorical effect. Rather, it was an individual
determination based on the conduct of the state of New Mexico which
resulted in the imposition of sanctions affecting the state. Further, as the
court in Thomas noted, the imposition of sanctions by the EPA was
mandatory, not discretionary.67 Thus, given the indicia of adjudication as
explicated in outstanding case law, the action of the EPA more closely
fits the classification of adjudication.
The court's holding in Thomas that the EPA's action was rulemaking
because the nature of the dispute in the case involved legal conclusions
and not disputed facts, is not compelling. Clearly, judicial activity encompasses resolving controversies which involve no disputed facts but
focus on differing interpretations of law."
The EID, however, never questioned whether the EPA's action was
properly deemed rulemaking and never argued for a less deferential review
standard than "arbitrary and capricious." The court's readiness to find
that the EPA's action was rulemaking may in part result from the EID's
failure to raise the issue, reflecting the court's reluctance to have the case
hinge on an undisputed issue.' The willingness of the Thomas court to
examine the character of the proceeding in classifying the EPA's action
is not left without significance. The court's action represents a departure
66. Thomas, 789 F.2d at 833.
67. Recall in American Express Co., similar nondiscretionary actions by the Secretary of Treasury
were held to be adjudicatory. See supra note 26-28 and accompanying text.
68. Adjudication may be limited to disputed law and not involve disputed facts. DAVIS, supra
note 32, at § 7.2.
69. It is worth repeating that it is unclear how the outcome might have differed had the court
ruled that the EPA action was adjudication and proceeded under the substantial evidence standard
of review. Thus, it is with hesitation that the author asserts that the court's readiness to find that the
EPA's action was rulemaking was due to its reluctance to have the case hinge on an undisputed
issue.
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from strict adherance to APA definitions and classifications.7" The court
arrived at this departure in an interesting fashion.
In Thomas, the court cited Anaconda, as Tenth Circuit precedent for
looking beyond the APA definitions of rulemaking and adjudication. It
is difficult to see how Anaconda supports this proposition.
In Anaconda the EPA had promulgated a regulation limiting sulfur
oxide emissions in Deer Lodge County, Montana where Anaconda Copper
Company operated a smelter. The issue was whether the EPA's refusal
to grant Anaconda a trial type hearing on the proposed regulation promulgated under Section 7410 of the CAA was a violation of due process.
In holding that the congressional requirement of a public hearing had
been met without an adjudicatory hearing, the court relied on the absence
of the key words "on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing"
from Section 7410."7
By contrast, AppalachianPower Co. v. EPA72 offers clear support for
examining the character of a proceeding. However, Appalachian was
cited as support for the conclusion that the EPA's action was informal
rulemaking."

In Appalachian, the court specifically shyed away from what it perceived to be the time wasting and arbitrary linedrawing involved in classifying the action of approving an SIP, in order to devote time to fashioning
hybrid modes of procedure appropriate to the particular circumstances of
individual cases.74 The dispute in Appalachianwas on the type of hearing
parties were entitled to by due process where the EPA acts approving an
SIP. The court stated that modern precedent has discarded classification
of an action as rulemaking or adjudication as criteria for determining the
type of hearing to which parties are entitled.7 ' The court opined that the
70. The following is an example of strict adherence to APA definitions and classifications. "The
Administrative Procedures Act requires that there be an adjudicatory hearing only ifthe agency
statute specifies that the particular rulemaking hearings be 'on the record after opportunity for an
agency hearing.' " (emphasis added) Anaconda Company v. Ruckleshaus, 482 F.2d 1301, 1306
(10th Cir. 1973).
71. The court reasoned that although Congress provided § 7410 hearings were to be public and
that these hearings were in fact transcribed, this did not mean the hearing was to be adjudicatory.
Anaconda at 1306. Thus, the court's decision relied on the lack of triggering language in § 7410 of
the CAA. However, the court in response to the plaintiff's argument that was the only discharger
affected by the regulation stated "[the fact that Anaconda alone is involved is not conclusive on
the question as to whether the hearing should be adjudicatory." Id. Apparently the court in New
Mexico EID v. Thomas, took this language to suggest that if a hearing will affect only one party,
that fact may influence the characterization of the proceeding as adjudicatory or rulemaking. This
language hardly offers strong precedential support for examining the characteristics of a proceeding
in determining whether the proceeding is rulemaking or adjudication.
72. 477 F.2d, 495 (4th Cir. 1973).
73. Given the Appalachian court's discussion of the fruitlessness of classification of an action,
it is at best difficult to see why the court in Thomas cited Apppalachian as support for the conclusion
that the EPA action was informal rulemaking.
74. Appalachian, 477 F.2d at 500.
75. Id.
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direction of recent decisions is that procedural requirements depend in
part on the importance of the issues before the agency and must take into
account the kind of questions involved.76
Accordingly, if the resulting administrative action, whether regarded
as rulemaking or otherwise, 'is individual in impact and condemnatory in purpose' or 'when the issue presented is one which possesses
great substantive importance, or one which is unusually complex or
difficult to resolve on the basis of pleadings and argument,' a hearing
preceding any final administrative action is appropriate. On the other
hand, if a public hearing would appear unnecessary, either because
of other available procedures or because the proceeding presents
'only a question of law without any dispute on the facts' or 'the
ultimate decision will not be enhanced or assisted by the receipt of
evidence,' a prior hearing may be dispensed with.77
The court in Appalachianconcluded that, by affording interested parties
an adequate opportunity for a hearing before state authortities on an SIP,
eventually to be reviewed by the EPA, and assuming that state hearings
were adequate, the procedures followed by the EPA in approving the SIP
accorded with due process.7"
Because the dispute in Thomas did not focus on procedures used by
the EPA in its decision to impose sanctions, Appalachian is not helpful
insofar as it pertains to that issue. Further, the court in Appalachian
determined only that an adjudicatory hearing was not necessary, not that
the EPA action was rulemaking. Therefore, Appalachian does not offer
support for the proposition for which it was cited by the Thomas court.
In addition, the EPA action in Thomas has characteristics described in
Appalachian which indicates both that a hearing can be dispensed with
and that a hearing is required. 79 Thus, the criteria described in Appalachian
are not particularly useful as a tool to help determine the kind of agency
action involved in Thomas. Appalachian clearly can only be used as
support for the Thomas court's decision to examine the character of the
EPA proceeding.
The court in Thomas appears to have confused Anaconda and Appalachian in terms of the propositions they support. Appalachian supports
examining the characteristics of a proceeding in lieu of classification,
while Anaconda, through its reliance on statutory language and the APA
definitions, supports the court's conclusion that the EPA's action was
rulemaking.
76.
77.
78.
79.
while

Id. at 501.
Id.
Id.
On one hand the EPA action presented a question of law without any dispute on the facts,
on the other hand it was individual in impact and condemnatory in purpose.
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It is not readily apparent why the court cites these cases for the opposite
propositions. If the court in Thomas had cited Appalachian for the proposition it used Anaconda to support, it would have used Fourth Circuit
precedent to justify what may have appeared to be a marked and perhaps
unjustified departure from Tenth Circuit law into a controversial area of
administrative law. This awkward position may have been the real problem. The court preferred to stretch inferences in order to follow its own
persuasive precedent in justifying an examination of the character of a
proceeding, in lieu of borrowing precedent from another circuit. In addition, the court may not have wished to fully adopt the stance of the
court in Appalachian, on the issue of the fruitlessness of classification,
while leaning somewhat in that direction.
Since the classification of the EPA's action was not raised by EID as
an issue in the case, the question emerges why the court did not simply
state that the action was rulemaking and apply the appropriate standard
of review under the APA. The court may have been concerned with
creating precedent for future review of administrative actions and found
in Thomas an opportunity to lean in the direction of what the court in
Appalachiantermed "modem precedent." 8" The Thomas court, however,
did this in a very modest fashion, adhering to the APA classification
scheme in result, but subtly suggesting manuevering room for examining
the character of a proceeding in future decisions. Since the court did not
explain the significance of its excursion into examining the characteristics
of a proceeding, the full import of its doing so will be left to future Tenth
Circuit decisions.
Application of the Standard of Review
The reasoning involved in upholding the EPA's use of Section 7506(a)
to impose sanctions is somewhat complex. New Mexico had in fact
submitted an SIP which had been approved by the EPA prior to its invalidation by the New Mexico Supreme Court in Chapman v. Luna. Under
Section 7506(a)(3) of the CAA, sanctions are imposed where an SIP has
not been submitted or reasonable efforts toward submitting an SIP have
not been made. 8' Literally interpreting the text of Section 7506(a)(3), it
appears inappropriate to apply this section where New Mexico had submitted an SIP and that SIP had been approved. The court therefore had
to employ what it called a "legal fiction" (that New Mexico had not
submitted an SIP) to uphold the EPA's action."
80. Appalachian, 477 F2d at 500.
81. 42 U.S.C. § 7506(a)(3) states in pertinent part: "the administrator shall not ... award any
grants authorized by this chapter . . (3) where the administrator finds ... that the Governor has
not submitted an implementation plan which considers each of the elements required by § 7502 of
this title .... (emphasis added).

82. Thomas, 789 F.2d at 833.
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The court reached this result by concluding that the EPA in effect
interpreted "considers" as "satisfies" in the text of Section 7506(a)(3).
Under the EPA's construction of Section 7506(a)(3), upheld by the court,
a submitted and approved plan must also satisfy all the requirements of
Section 7502 including adequate funding and legal authority to implement
the plan. 3 The court ruled that when an "approved SIP contains an
element that is invalidated by. . .state law, adoption by the EPA is also
invalidated. The status is as if the state had not submitted an SIP. '""
Thus, where an SIP has not satisified the condition that all its elements
are legally enforceable and adequately funded, the EPA may find that the
SIP has not been submitted. 5
The plain effect of the use of the legal fiction described in this case is
to make approved SIPs vulnerable to state law challenges, with the further
effect that CAA funds may be sanctioned. As the court recognized, this
provides states with motivation to do thorough research into the funding
provisions and legal authority necessary to implement all the elements
of an SIP.s The court in Thomas emphasized that this result is consistent
with the goals of the CAA. The result is also in accord with EPA policy
under the CAA, exemplified by an EPA statement published in the Federal
Register and quoted by the court in Thomas. 7
The court's willingness to employ a legal fiction in upholding the EPA
action represents a commitment to the goals of the CAA, and also represents frustration with and intolerance for foot-dragging by the states.
The net result is that states are on notice that sanctions imposed by the
EPA for foot-dragging will generally be upheld as comporting with the
purposes of the CAA, and that EPA's construction of CAA language to
further the purposes of the Act will largely be welcomed in the Tenth
Circuit.
83. Id. Section 7502 provides for additional requirements for an SIP in non-attainment areas.
Since § 7502 specifies additional elements, those elements are still subject to the general requirements
for SIPs spelled out in § 7410.. The courts reasoning on this point is not explicit. Nevertheless, the
court held that the EPA could proceed under § 7506(a) since New Mexico's SIP did not satisfy the
terms of § 7410(a)(2)(F) which require the state to submit a legally enforceable plan.
84. Id.
85. The court found explicit precedential support for the use of such a fiction in Sierra Club v.
Indiana-Kentucky Electric Corp., 716 F.2d 1145 (7th Cir. 1983). Indiana submitted a SIP with a
provision (APC-13) designed to regulate SO 2 emissions. The EPA accepted and approved the plan.
However, APC-13 was promulgated without adherence to Indiana procedural law and was subsequently invalidated in state court. "Because administrative actions taken without substantial compliance with applicable procedures are invalid, it is as if Indiana never submitted APC-13. Since a
valid APC-13 was never submitted, EPA's adoption of APC-13 cannot be given effect since (the)
EPA approved a provision which was invalid when submitted to the agency." Id. at 1448.
86. The carrot for states is substantial federal subsidy of air pollution planning and control
programs under § 7506 as well as grants for transportation.
87. Thomas, 789 F.2d at 833. "The state has an affirmative duty to investigate and compile data
on the required elements, analyze that data, and consider and incorporate the required elements into
the SIP in a manner consistent with the intent and purpose of the act." 50 Fed. Reg. 8618, (Mar.
4, 1985).
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CONCLUSION
On the broad issue of judicial review of agency action, the decision
in this case signifies support for case by case determination -of the appropriate standard of review for agency action through an examination
of the characteristics of a proceeding and the issues involved. Although
not a landmark case, the court's language demonstrates a willingness to
look beyond APA definitions and criteria for classifying agency actions.
The Tenth Circuit has indicated it will uphold EPA interpretations of
the CAA that further the purposes of the Act, even when doing so involves
an effective rewriting of some langauage by the EPA. Consequently,
EPA's approval of an SIP is vulnerable to state law challenges, and states
may have sanctions imposed when an element of an SIP is unenforceable
under state law. Thus, states must conduct sufficient research into the
adequacy and legal bases for all the elements of an SIP or run the risk
of losing approval of projects and availability of funds under the CAA.
DALE R. RUGGE

